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The Tariff Equivalent and Forgone Trade Effects of Prohibitive 
Technical Barriers to Trade 
 
Introduction 
Many countries implement drastic measures to restrict trade in a product associated with a 
perceived or actual risk of transferring a pest or disease into their geography. These occurrences 
of nontariff trade barriers for human or plant health have increased as tariffs have been falling 
worldwide (Beghin (2008)). Trade agreements recognize countries’ right to set their own 
standards and regulations on trade in order to protect human, animal, or plant health or life. For 
example, two World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) Measures Agreement and the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, allow 
countries to set their own standards to protect plant and human health. These agreements, 
however, require that the standards adopted not to be discriminatory or protectionist. In practice, 
some countries impose stricter-than-necessary conditions on imported goods to isolate domestic 
producers from international competition (James and Anderson, 1998). In addition to the existing 
tariff barriers, the stricter regulations may lead to questionable impediments to imports that 
compete with domestic products. When the possibility of a disease or pest transmission is very 
low or threat to food safety is negligible, these trade impediments cause welfare losses for 
importing countries and mercantilist losses (“injury” in WTO language) for exporting countries 
due to reduced exports. These strict production, storage, and inspection requirements induce a 
higher unit cost, and higher price of the imported goods, and in some extreme cases, trade 
vanishes with prohibitive requirements. When trade flows do not exist, estimation of the tariff 
equivalent of SPS regulation or TBT is a challenging task because no reference imports exist and   2 
because part of the tariff equivalent will be redundant
1 when the policy is strictly prohibitive. 
Quantifying the impact of the removal of the SPS regulation or TBT is also difficult for the same 
reasons. 
In this paper, we derive a new way to estimate the tariff equivalent and trade effects of a 
prohibitive TBT or SPS measure based on Wales and Woodland’s Kuhn-Tucker approach to 
corner solutions in consumer choice. This approach has been successfully applied to a random 
utility model of recreation demand in environmental economics (e.g., Phaneuf, Kling, and 
Herriges, 2000). The latter authors apply the Kuhn-Tucker approach to recreation demand for 
fishing sites. The random utility model accounts for the fact that consumers do not fish at all the 
recreation sites. The demands for some sites for some particular consumers are systematically 
zero because of the higher transportation cost or personal preferences. Our approach to zero trade 
is similar in spirit. Because of trade costs (TBT, distance, and tariffs) and/or preferences, some 
consumers in a given country never consume a subset of the importable goods. Our contribution 
is to coherently integrate trade cost in the pricing of goods across borders into the random utility 
framework of Wales and Woodland, which predicts when corner solutions are likely to emerge 
in an internally consistent utility maximization framework. The framework incorporates the 
restrictions of utility theory and the behavioral implications of corner solutions. It allows 
recovery of the implicit prices inclusive of trade costs at which trade has vanished. The forgone 
trade and associated welfare losses can also be derived. 
A large empirical literature exists on how to measure technical barriers and their effects 
when imports are positive. The price-wedge approach is often used to estimate the tariff 
                                                 
1 Just binding corners in consumption imply a marginal rate of substitution just equal to relative 
prices inclusive of the trade cost and the TBT, hence an exactly prohibitive tariff. Strictly 
binding corners (marginal rate of substitution not equal to relative prices), imply a strictly 
prohibitive tariff equivalent, hence a redundant component in the tariff equivalent.   
   3 
equivalent and trade impact of a technical barrier. Most applications of the tariff equivalent 
assume perfect substitution of domestic and imported goods and measure the tariff equivalent as 
the difference between the domestic protected price and the world price (Calvin and Krissoff, 
1998; Deardorff and Stern, 1998; James and Anderson, 1998). Yue, Beghin, and Jensen (2006) 
have extended that approach of estimating the tariff equivalent of TBTs by accounting for 
imperfect substitution of domestic and imported goods, consumers’ home good preference, and 
trade costs. Their method still relies on positive trade flows to identify the tariff equivalent of the 
TBT or SPS measure. Despite these improvements and its usefulness, the price wedge approach 
has some caveats. It can overstate the cost of incriminated technical barriers by potentially 
omitting some other sources of trade costs or other variables that may contribute to the price 
wedge.  
Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2006) econometrically estimate the impacts of numerous non 
tariff barriers (NTB) on trade flows for a large number of commodities and countries but without 
accounting for prices. Then they recover the tariff equivalent of these NTBs using corresponding 
own-price elasticities of import demand generated separately. Disdier, Fontagné and Mimouni 
(2008) use the latter estimates in an investigation of the effects of TBTs in global agricultural 
trade. Andriamananjara et al. (2004) also provide a tariff equivalent of NTBs by regressing 
observed retail price gaps between major cities on nontariff barriers indicators, using a simple 
“average” quality approach to product differentiation. Again, trade flows have to be observed to 
compute these prices, which are biased downward because they exclude the price of goods 
facing prohibitive barriers. 
Some literature shows how to predict trade volume using the Tobit model when many trade 
observations contain zero values. For example, Eaton and Tamura (1994) recommend adopting   4 
the threshold Tobit model in which trade volume appears to be positive only when desired trade 
exceeds some minimum threshold. However, most investigations of trade costs attempting to 
explain trade flows use the gravity equation approach with log(1+trade) as the dependent 
variable to overcome the problem of zero trade flow instead of using the Tobit model (e.g., 
Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni, 2008; see also Feenstra, 2004, chapter 5). More recently, 
Ranjan and Tobias (2007) propose a Bayesian procedure for estimating a generalized threshold 
Tobit model to avoid adding unity arbitrarily to the dependent variable to circumvent taking the 
log of zero. The latter authors do not consider price or TBTs as determinants of trade flows.
2 The 
mentioned literature used different ways to deal with zero trade volume, yet none of them is 
related to the estimation of the tariff equivalent and trade effect of a TBT when trade volume is 
systematically zero for all observations of bilateral trade between two countries. This problem is 
likely to arise in the case of bilateral trade data for disaggregated sectors or a single commodity. 
The problem is policy relevant as disaggregated products are at the heart of many trade disputes 
(e.g., apple, cotton, computer chips, specific meat products). 
Additionally to addressing the prohibitive TBT, we account for consumers’ heterogeneous 
preferences for substitute goods by place of origin. We do so to avoid problems arising from 
assuming homogeneous goods in the computation of the tariff equivalent of a policy and its 
effects (Salerian, Davis, and Jomini, 1999; Yue, Beghin, and Jensen, 2006). Imperfect 
substitution tends to increase the size of the tariff equivalent but decreases the import expansion 
following the policy elimination. Extensive applied literature since Armington’s seminal paper 
shows that consumers have different preferences for close substitute disaggregated food goods 
from different countries.  
                                                 
2 See also Martin and Pham (2008) for an extensive coverage of treatments of zeros in gravity 
equations.   5 
Using recent data and the proposed new approach, we provide a policy-relevant 
investigation of Australian phytosanitary regulations imposed on imports of New Zealand apples 
because of the alleged risk of introducing fire blight in Australian orchards. We compute the 
tariff equivalent of this Australian SPS regulation impeding bilateral apple trade between 
Australia and New Zealand and quantify the impact of removing this regulation policy on apple 
trade flows and welfare. The removal of the barriers would induce net welfare gains around 
US$50 millions annually for Australia; forgone apple trade amounts to about 50 million metric 
tons valued at around US$35 to US$40 millions. 
This application has much policy relevance as the New Zealand-Australia apple dispute has 
lasted for more than 80 years without being effectively resolved. As further explained later,  
prohibitive SPS requirements make it impossible to export apples from New Zealand to Australia. 
A related apple trade dispute between Japan and the United States was resolved in the summer of 
2005 through a WTO dispute settlement body. The WTO rulings required Japan to remove its 
fire blight regulations because they were not science based and constituted protectionism (WTO, 
2005). These rulings have great potential to boost the case of New Zealand against the Australian 
fire blight regulations, which in essence are also protectionist. Mature fruit that are shown to be 
free of symptoms are not effective carriers of fire blight and do not require the extensive 
procedure dictated by the Australian SPS regulations (WTO, 2005). 
The next section introduces the Kuhn-Tucker model and the derivation of the system of 
equations to be empirical estimated to recover preference parameters and the tariff equivalent of 
technical measures on prices. Then data and estimation results are presented, followed by the 
welfare computations. Policy implications are discussed in the conclusion section. 
   6 
Conceptual model for the econometric estimation of a prohibitive technical barrier 
Suppose the typical consumer in a given country maximizes utility of consuming market goods 
(x, AOG) subject to a budget constraint, or 
,
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where  1 ( , , )' M x x = x ⋯  is the vector of consumer goods of interest in the analysis and AOG is an 
aggregate all other goods assumed to be the numéraire; yis a vector of socio-demographic 
information of consumers in the importing country impacting preferences for x through 
parameters 
￿; 
￿is vector of preferences for attributes of x not based on socio-demographics 
(country of origin, for example). Vector  1 ( , , )' M e e =
￿ ⋯  is a vector of random components 
capturing preference variation known to the consumer but not to the researcher; W W W W is the vector 
of taste parameters expressing minimum consumption thresholds; weights 
( , , , ) exp( ) j j j j j j j y d e d e ¢ = + + y
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￿ y  represent consumers’ preference in the importing country 
for heterogeneous product xj; function v expresses how AOG relates to utility. Finally, 
1 ( , , )' M p p = p ⋯  is the vector of associated consumer prices including trade costs (transportation, 
and trade barriers); I is the income of the representative consumer. 
Consumer prices in the given country are further decomposed into an export unit cost 
component and trade costs arising from distance (transportation cost), tariffs, and technical 
barriers to trade. For good j, this consumer price is ( )(1 ) j j j j j p wp d t TBT g = + + + , where 
1 ( , , )' M wp wp = wp ⋯ is the vector of world prices/export unit costs for goods x; 
￿dj represents the   7 
transportation cost to bring good j (i.e. produced in country j) to the importing country. Vector 
1 ( , , )' M d d = d ⋯  represents distances between the product sources and the importing country 
under consideration, and g  is the unit rate of transportation cost and associated fees. For 
simplicity, we assume the unit rate to be the same per unit of distance. The latter is acceptable as 
we have in mind applications to single commodities, which are similar in terms of transportation 
characteristics. Transportation cost enters price as per unit cost component given the recent 
evidence in favor of the latter formulation (Hummels and Skiba, 2004). The latter authors found 
that a specific (dollars per unit) specification of shipping cost was econometrically superior to an 
ad-valorem (% of unit price) one in applied trade analysis. Shipping cost shifts the supply faced 
by consumers in a parallel manner rather than proportionally. Vector 1 ( , , )' M t t = t ⋯  is the vector 
of ad valorem tariff imposed by the importing country on foreign goods x; vector 
1 ( , , )' M TBT TBT = TBT ⋯  represents the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of TBTs and SPS measures 
increasing the cost of products in that importing country. TBTj is set equal to zero for domestic 
and imported products in countries without technical barriers to trade.
3 
The corresponding first-order necessary and sufficient Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
(.)
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3 The measures imposed by Australia are strictly speaking SPS measures. While broadly 
speaking, they could be considered TBTs as their economic effects are similar to TBTs. In the 
WTO, the agreements governing SPS and TBT measures and the burden of proof in a dispute 
over these agreements are different (Wilson) . Hence, we refer to SPS measures when we 
analyze the Australian case in later sections.   8 
[ (.) ] 0 AOG AOG U l - = ,                                                                                   (5) 
with  (.)
j x U =
( , , , ) exp( ) j j j j j j j
j j j j x x






, and with l  being the marginal utility of 
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Using a simple rearrangement of terms in (6) and (7), we define  
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Then, conditions (6) and (7) are expressed as 
  ( , , , , ; , , , , ) j j j g e g = x y wp d t TBT
￿
￿ W W W W  when  0 j x > ,                            (9) 
and 
  ( , , , , ; , , , , ) j j j g e g £ x y wp d t TBT
￿
￿ W W W W  when  0 j x = .                           (10) 
The specification of the joint density function  ( ) fe
￿ together with the above expressions 
of  j e ’s provide necessary information to set up the likelihood function for estimation. Suppose a 
given consumer’s first K commodities’ consumption is zero, and remaining K+1 to M 
commodities’ consumption is positive (that is,  K j x j ,..., 1 , 0 = = , and  M K j x j ,..., 1 , 0 + = > ). 
Then, this consumer’s contribution to the likelihood function is given by the following 
probability f:    9 
1
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We assume that the  ' j s e  are identical and independent, and follow the standard normal 
distribution. Assuming N available observations, the log-likelihood function to be used to 
estimate the tariff equivalent TBT and parameters  ,  ,  , and  g
￿
￿
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where i indicates observation i and i=1,…,N;  and j is commodity j and j=1,…, M; Fis the 
cumulative density function of standard normal distribution for the goods that are not consumed, 
and f is the density function of standard normal distribution for the goods that are consumed.  
 
Application to Australian SPS regulations on apple trade 
The competitiveness of Australian and New Zealand apple industries 
Apple industry experts rank New Zealand apples first among apples exporters, ahead of 
Chile and European exporters and Australia, based on various criteria (productivity, quality, 
price, input and infrastructure) (World Apple Report, 2000; Dixon and Hewett, 2000; Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, New Zealand).  New Zealand exports about 55% of its total crop, 
which is higher than any other significant export competitor (McKenna and Murray, 2002). This 
large share of production going to world markets suggest that these apples are competitive in 
export markets and well liked by world consumers.  
Australian policies and the apple dispute with New Zealand 
Despite the high quality and relatively low cost of New Zealand apples, Australia has prohibited   10 
importation of New Zealand apples since 1921 to protect Australia from fire blight, a disease 
caused by a bacterium called erwinia amylovora, which affect apple and pear trees. At the time 
fire blight was absent on Australian soil (Binder, 2002). In 1919, fire blight was discovered in 
Auckland, New Zealand. Two years later, Australia banned imports of New Zealand apples. In 
1983, Australia and New Zealand set up the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 
Trade Agreement. Under this agreement, the elimination of all tariffs and quantitative restrictions 
was achieved in 1990, with apples as one of the most notable exceptions.  
Between 1986 and 1995, New Zealand repeatedly applied to export apples to Australia but 
the applications were declined. In 1997, Australia released its Pest Risk Analysis regarding apple 
imports from New Zealand. In the same year, New Zealand observed fire blight in the 
Melbourne Royal Botanic Gardens. In 1998, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service 
(AQIS) released a draft risk assessment refusing imports of New Zealand apples. One year later, 
in 1999, New Zealand requested a review of available risk management options for apple exports 
from that country. In 2000, the Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
proposed allowing imports of New Zealand apples but imposed the world’s strictest biosecurity 
conditions (See Binder (2002) for a detailed list of these conditions). In 2001, AQIS 
recommended lifting the 80-year ban, but this recommendation was rejected by the Australian 
Senate Rural Affairs Committee.  
In 2004, the Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry released an 
import risk analysis and recommended admitting apple imports from New Zealand subject to 
stringent controls. In 2006, the final risk assessment by Australia allowed imports of New 
Zealand apples into every state except Western Australia. However, the New Zealand 
government and apple growers charged that the technical conditions set by Australia were not   11 
materially changed and were so strict that few of the apple growers if any would be able to afford 
exporting to Australia. The conditions include orchard inspections of fire blight and European 
canker symptoms in New Zealand, the utilization of disinfection treatments in packing houses, 
and auditing with the involvement of the AQIS, among other things. Associated SPS measures 
also contested by New Zealand address apple leafcurling midge (WTO 2007). New Zealand 
ministers and growers thought this move ignored scientifically based argument and was 
effectively a trade barrier. After consultations with Australia failed in 2007, New Zealand 
requested the establishment of a WTO dispute panel to investigate the Australian SPS policies 
(WTO 2007). In early 2008, The WTO established a panel to investigate the consistency of the 
Australian apple policy with the WTO SPS agreement (WTO 2008).  
Data, econometric estimation, and results 
The derived framework is applied to the Australian SPS measures precluding imports of New 
Zealand apples. Three types of apples are considered (Australia, New Zealand, aggregate others); 
they are differentiated by subscript j (j=AU, NZ and Other). Vector  ( , , ) c AUc NZc Otherc x x x = x  
represents per capita consumption of the three kinds of apples in any country c included in the 
data set. For instance,  AUc x  is a vector of per capita consumption of Australian apples in any 
country c (Bangladesh, Barbados, etc…) which consumes Australian apples;  AUAU x  is simply the 
per capita consumption of the domestic apples in Australia, and  NZAU x is the per capita 
consumption of New Zealand apple in Australia which is zero. Similarly,  NZNZ x is the per capita 
consumption of domestic apples in New Zealand. This grouping allows us to identify the relative 
preferences between Australian and New Zealand apples and the tariff equivalent of the policies 
affecting the potential flow of New Zealand apples to Australia. 
  To estimate the tariff equivalent of the Australian barriers brought by the strict conditions   12 
imposed by Australia on imports of New Zealand apples, we incorporate a panel of 38 countries 
over time, including the United States, European countries, Canada, Singapore, Bangladesh, 
China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, 
and others as observations of our representative consumer. The countries and data years are 
listed in appendix table 1 (available on Agecon Search). We included all countries having multi-
year data on apple trade either with New Zealand or Australia as reported by UN Comtrade and 
having fresh apple consumption and production data reported by FAO.   
We simply capture the individual socio-demographic effects in any country c by including 
its development level approximated by per-capita GDP (scalar yc = per capita GDP in country c) 
in the utility function to see how the marginal utility of each apple type varies as consumer 
income grows. The influence of y on apple type j is captured by parameter j h  (now a scalar) in 
equation (8). 
Aggregate fresh apple consumption data come from FAO. Population, and bilateral export 
quantities and prices data come from the United Nations’ Comtrade database. Per capita 
consumption of the three apple types in a country is defined as follows: xAUc  is the bilateral flow 
of Australian apples to that country c (for c ≠ Australia) normalized by its population; In 
Australia, xAUAU  is the total consumption of domestic apples normalized by Australian population. 
Variable xNZc is  a  flow of New Zealand apples to country c normalized by c’s population (c ≠ 
New Zealand). In New Zealand, xNZNZ  is the total consumption of domestic apples normalized by 
New Zealand’s population. Last, xOtherc is aggregate consumption of apple in country c minus the 
sum of Australian and New Zealand apples flows to country c, also normalized by c’s population. 
In Australia and New Zealand, domestic consumption of domestic apples is defined as the 
aggregate apple consumption of the respective country minus total imported apples, then   13 
normalized by respective population to be expressed in a per capita basis. Per capita 
consumption of other apples in these two countries (xOtherAU  and xOtherNZ) is defined as their 
respective total imports normalized by their population since neither Australia nor New Zealand 
do trade apples with each other. 
The bilateral export prices for Australian apples ( AU wp ) and New Zealand apples ( NZ wp ) 
are free-on-board (FOB) prices, which exclude international transportation fee and insurance). 
The latter costs are explicitly accounted for through trade costs associated with distance. The 
corresponding unit fee (dollar per kilometer per kilogram) is econometrically estimated (g ). The 
distances (d) between exporting and importing countries are sea distance via the Suez canal in 
kilometers (Hengeveld, 1999). When bilateral trade is zero, we use the FOB prices averaged over 
all other destinations for the same year as a proxy for the unobserved export price associated 
with the zero flow. 
Outside of Australia and New Zealand, the price for all other apples is a consumption-
weighted average of other imported fresh apples and domestically produced apples. The unit 
price of other imported apples is the cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) prices provided by FAO. 
The importing prices for all other apples are derived by using the value of imports (valued at CIF 
prices) of all other apples divided by the total weight of imports of all other apples in the 
importing country. We use CIF prices instead of FOB prices plus transportation cost to overcome 
the multiple sourcing and distances associated with other imported apples, instead of guessing 
dother to eventually estimate  Other Other wp d g + . In Australia and New Zealand, the consumption of 
domestic apples is valued at their FOB price, which is a good approximation of the wholesale 
price (domestic producer price plus costs from farm to harbor/wholesale place). The tariff rates 
are obtained from WTO online tariff rate schedules. In Australia, tariffs and the tariff equivalent   14 
of the SPS policies are applied to imported apples from NZ, whereas in other countries, only 
tariffs are applied to imports. We have 413 observations.  
The optimization method used in maximum likelihood estimation is the conjugate gradients 
method of Fletcher and Reeves (1964). The program is run in R version 2.4.1. The estimation 
results are shown in table 1. 
  With the exception of parameters 
￿, all parameters estimated have expected signs and are 
individually statistically different from zero at a 1% critical level or less. The estimate of TBT, 
the ad valorem equivalent of the SPS barriers Australia imposes on New Zealand apples, is on 
average about 99% of the FOB price inclusive of transportation cost ( NZ NZAU wp d g + ) with dNZAU 
being the bilateral distance. Estimated preference parameter  ˆ
NZ d  is greater than  ˆ
AU d , which 
indicates that the representative consumer prefers New Zealand apples to Australian apples. This 
result is in line with the findings of Dixon and Hewett (2000), who show that New Zealand 
apples are regarded as having premium quality. This results is also consistent with New Zealand 
apples export volumes to the world being much larger than those of Australian apples over the 
years.  ˆ
Other d is the largest of the three 
￿
 estimates. It is explained by the predominance of 
domestic apple consumption in “other” countries relative to the consumption of traded apples. 
“Other” countries make the bulk of the dataset. 
  The average unit fee for international transportation and insurance 
￿ is estimated to be 
$8.55*10
-5/(km*kg). This is comparable to estimates provided by Calvin, Krissoff, and Foster 
(2008) on fees to transport apples from the United States to Japan.  Estimated parameters  ˆ
￿ 
measure how consumers’ marginal preferences for apples vary by country as characterized by 
their development level. The positive  ˆ
￿values indicate that the marginal utility of apples is 
higher in more developed countries but the estimates are not significantly different from zero.   15 
Estimates of 
￿ are positive and significant, and since they are different from 1, weak 
complementary is rejected --attributes of goods do matter even if they are not consumed. 
￿ can 
also be rationalized as threshold minimum consumption levels as in Eaton and Tamura (1994), 
and Ranjan and Tobias (2007). Finally, the point estimate of the marginal utility of AOG, 
v’(AOG), is significant and positive. 




￿, and using another algorithm (Nelder and Mead, 1965). We have 
obtained very similar results. The TBT estimates in these alternative runs remain significant and 
in the tight range of 0.70 to 1. Some models restricting 
￿ to be equal across apple types yield 
positive and significant estimates of 
￿, but the latter result is not robust. Results of these 
alternative runs are available from the authors upon request. 
  The dollar value equivalent to TBT (in specific tariff form) changes across years as apple 
prices change. Table 2 shows the specific tariff equivalent of TBT (dollar per kg) from 2003 to 
2005. The average of this specific tariff equivalent across the three years is $0.97/kg. 
Welfare analysis  
If the Australian SPS barriers were removed, Australian apple producers would face 
Marshallian surplus losses with the introduction of New Zealand apples. We use a small 
displacement model to endogenize and determine the price of domestic (Australian) apples and 
eventually infer the impact of removing the SPS barriers on imports and domestic (Australian) 
market equilibrium. We model the policy shock as setting TBT to be equal to zero. Let  AU S  be 
the domestic supply of Australian apples, which is an increasing function of domestic apple price 
and exogenous parameter 
￿: 
( , )  
S
AU AU AU S wp wp
w u u = .                                                             (13)   16 
Parameter  S w represents the own-price elasticity of the domestic (Australian) apple supply. 
Decreases in parameter u  would reflect upward shifts in supply if phytosanitary contamination 
occurred with infested New Zealand imports, and induced an increase in the Australian cost of 
production. Equilibrium domestic price 
e
AU wp  and quantity are determined by the market 
equilibrium condition, or  
  ( , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
e e e
AU AU AUAU AU NZAU OtherAU AU s AU AUs AUs NZs Others
s
S wp X wp p p X wp d t p p u g = + + + ∑ ,   (14) 
with index and subscript s denoting the export destinations for Australian apples consumed 
abroad. The aggregate demand  ( , , )
e
AUAU AU NZAU OtherAU X wp p p  for Australian apples is the per 
capita demand for Australian apples by Australian consumers derived from the first-order 
conditions of the utility maximization and multiplied by population. A similar definition holds 
for XAU s. Prices pij denotes the price of apple i in country j. 
With the elimination of the SPS barriers (TBT=0), the internal price of New Zealand apples 
in Australia, NZAU p , decreases whereas the internal price of Australian apples,  AU wp , will fall if 
there is no risk of contamination from the increased imports. The domestic demand for 
Australian apples declines with the change in  NZAU p . Then the domestic market adjusts at a lower 
price such that demand equals supply. Imports of New Zealand apples expand, as the direct 
effect of the decrease in the New Zealand price is larger than the feedback effect of the lower 
Australian domestic price, by stability. If fire blight contamination occurs, the price of Australian 
domestic apples may not decrease, as the domestic supply shifts upward to reflect the increased 
cost from contamination. The Australian domestic apple equilibrium quantity is further reduced 
by the disease contamination. Imports increase. For simplicity, we assume away feedback effects 
from apple suppliers into the income of the representative consumer.    17 
The consumer welfare is measured using compensation variation (CV). Let 




￿ , , denote the indirect utility function by maximizing the utility function defined 
in equation (1). The CV associated with a change in the price vectors from
0 p to 
1 p is defined by  
1 ( ; , , , ) ( ( ; , , , ), ; , , , ) V I V I CV I = -
0 0 1 p y
￿
￿






￿ , , , , , , W W W W W W W W W W W W        (15) 
The CV defined in (15) is a random variable since it is a function of 
￿ . We estimate the 
mean and standard deviation of CV to give policy implications based on a range of outcomes. In 
addition, there is no closed-form solution for CV or its mean due to the nonlinearity of the utility-
maximization problem. Therefore, numerical bisection, which is one of the numerical techniques, 
is applied to solve this problem (Phaneuf, Kling and Herriges, 2000).  
The random utility function is nonlinear with respect to the estimated parameters and 
random disturbance terms 
￿  appear in the random utility function. Hence, the resulting demand 
functions, CV and producer surplus (PS) are nonlinear with respect to the estimated parameters 
and are functions of 
￿ . Because  ( ( )) ( ( )) E h h E ¹ x x  if h(x) is a nonlinear function of x (E(x) 
denotes the expectation of x), we cannot substitute the mean values of the estimated parameters 
and 
￿  into the demand, CV and PS functions to obtain the means of the associated measures. To 
avoid this problem we adopt the following numerical algorithm: 
1)  Draw the estimated parameters 




￿) from the underlying 
asymptotic distribution, which are assumed to be asymptotically normal and repeat  1 N times; 
2)  For each 
( ) i
￿ (i=1,…, 1 N ), draw the random disturbance terms 
￿  from the assumed standard 
normal distribution and repeat  2 N times; 
3)  Substitute 
( ) i
￿  and 
( ) j
￿  in equation (15) and use numerical bisection to solve for CV, which 
is denoted as 
) , ( j i CV ; Substitute 
( ) i
￿  and 
( ) j
￿ into the demand and PS functions and get the   18 
( , ) i j
NZ x  and 
( , ) i j PS ; 
4)  Average 
) , ( j i CV ，
( , ) i j
NZ x , and 






NZ x , and   
( ) i
PS ,which gives a Monte Carlo integration valuation of 
( ) ( )
i E CV e ，
( ) ( )
i
NZ E x e  and 
( ) ( )
i E PS e ; 





NZ x ’s and   
( ) i
PS ’s provide the distribution of the mean of 
CV, NZ x , and PS  with respect to the uncertainty regarding the estimated parameters 
￿. 





NZ x and   
( ) i
PS  over the  1 N  draws of the parameters provides a consistent 





NZ x ’s, and 
 
( ) i
PS ’s to estimate the standard errors of the estimated mean of CV, NZ x and  PS . 
Since Australian imports of New Zealand fresh apples have been zero over the years 
because of the import ban that preceded the prohibitive SPS measures, the increase in imports is 
simply the Australian consumers’ optimal consumption quantity of New Zealand apples by 
maximizing their utility function. The above-mentioned algorithm is used to estimate the 
increase in New Zealand imports ( ˆNZ x D ), CV (  CV ) and change in PS (   PS D ) induced by the 
removal of TBT. We set  1 N  to be 100 and  2 N  to be 1000. The average increasing amounts in 
New Zealand imports and the associated standard errors from 2003 to 2005 are shown in table 2. 
By eliminating TBT, Australian imports of New Zealand apples would increase substantially, 
between 47,400 MT and 54,407 MT, across the three years (3-year average import volume = 
50,310 MT) . The dollar amount of this trade expansion provides a base to measure of the trade 
“injury” caused by Australia to New Zealand and is listed in the third column of table 2. It ranges   19 
from US$35.95 millions to US$39.25 millions over the three years. 
  Changes in welfare arising from the elimination of the TBT vary depending on the chosen 
assumption on the transmission of disease associated with the introduction of New Zealand 
apples. The elimination of the TBT leads to an increase in imports of New Zealand apples, which 
would increase the social welfare from consuming apples, other things being held constant. In 
the case of no disease transmission, the introduction of New Zealand apples lowers the price of 
Australian domestic apples through competition because of the lower price of New Zealand 
apples and the relatively small transportation fee due to the close distance between the two 
countries. The producers’ welfare decreases. Nevertheless, because of the lower price of apples, 
consumers will be better off. The total social welfare change depends on the relative value of 
consumers’ welfare and producers’ welfare but with net expected gains as long as terms-of-trade 
effects are moderate. 
However, in the case of disease transmission, the Australian domestic supply will further 
decrease because of the damage brought by fire blight contamination of Australian orchards. 
This will further deteriorate producers’ welfare. Table 3 gives the welfare implications of 
eliminating the TBT between 2003 and 2005 in the no-disease transmission case. Following 
Arthur (2006), we assume a medium-term supply elasticity of apples to be 0.3.  
CV  and change of PS ( PS D ) are shown in the fifth and sixth columns of table 3, and the 
net welfare changes following the removal of TBT are shown in the last column. Not surprisingly, 
CV is larger than the loss of PS, and the net social welfare is positive across the years with gains 
to consumers being 2 to 3 times as large as producers’ losses. 
  Following Yue, Beghin, and Jensen (2006) and Arthur (2006), we assume that production 
of apples would decrease by a fixed proportion of 20% in case of fire blight contamination of   20 
Australian orchards. This estimate comes from the Queensland Government’s Department of 
Primary Industries and Fisheries. Disease transmission  shifts the  Australian domestic supply of 
apples upward as the variable cost of production increases. The far right columns of Table 3 
show the welfare implications with disease transmission.  
From table 3, we see that when there is disease transmission, CV  is lower compared with 
the case when there is no disease transmission and the loss of PS slightly increases although the 
increase in domestic price resulting from the supply shift almost compensates the loss induced by 
the disease. The net welfare through the years is still positive, which indicates that it is still 
optimal to eliminate the SPS policy even if there is a significant possibility of disease 
transmission. If we incorporate the welfare of both New Zealand and Australia, “global” social 
welfare would be enhanced further by the elimination of the policy.  
One concern would be that these net gains results would be invalidated if  the assumption 
of 20% reduction in domestic production underestimates the true impact of the disease as it 
spreads to Australia. We re-estimate the welfare consequences of  eliminating the SPS policy 
assuming that domestic production reduction is 30% and then 40% respectively for the three 
years. We find that net welfare is still positive across the three years, and that these net welfare 
gains decrease nearly linearly in the production damage rate. A 50% proportional increase in the 
production reduction (from a 20% to a 30% reduction) decreases welfare gains by roughly $10.7 
million (in 2003) as we find welfare gains of  $28.12 million under a 30% reduction and of 
$17.49 million under a 40% reduction (in 2003). The detailed results are available from the 
authors. This further analysis confirms it is optimal for Australia to remove its policy even if the 
spread of fire blight brought severe damage to its domestic production.  
To see how sensitive the welfare implication to the different assumption of supply elasticity   21 
of AU apples, we also calculate the welfare consequence of the SPS policy removal under the 
S w =0.2 and  S w =0.4 respectively, assuming no disease transmission. Results are shown in table 
4. Net welfare is still positive under the different assumed values of supply elasticities. Exact 
knowledge of the supply response of Australian apples is not pivotal to establish the positive net 
gains from eliminating the prohibitive barriers.  
 
Conclusion 
We tailor Wales and Woodland’s approach to corner solutions in consumption decisions to the 
analysis of prohibitive nontariff trade barriers (TBTs, SPS measures). The random utility model 
is applied to actual and potential trade flows consumed by international consumers depending on 
trade costs associated with the importable goods and consumer preferences. Trade vanishes 
under prohibitive technical barriers and leads to corners. Technical barriers, transportation costs, 
and tariff are incorporated in the measurement of trade costs. Their influence is recovered in the 
estimation of Kuhn-Tucker conditions coming from maximizing utility.  
Our paper bridges an important gap in the trade literature analyzing TBTs and SPS 
measures. The use of this type of trade barriers has been rising globally. We overcome the 
redundant component of the tariff equivalent of prohibitive technical barriers and the systematic 
lack of observed bilateral trade flow. We estimate the tariff equivalent of the barriers and 
compute the forgone trade effects associated with these prohibitive barriers. Prohibitive barriers 
inherently have a redundant component and forgone trade effects are difficult to compute. 
We apply the approach to trade restrictions in apple trade. The rigorous investigation of the 
Australia–New Zealand apple dispute validates the approach. Importantly, our research raises 
policy implications. The tariff equivalent of the Australian SPS measures is high (around 99%)   22 
and consumers prefer New Zealand apples to Australian apples, confirming previous findings on 
the premium quality of New Zealand apples. If all the Australian SPS measures were removed, 
the increase in New Zealand apple imports by Australia would be quite high. We provide an 
upper-bound estimate of the injury New Zealand could claim in a WTO dispute with Australia in 
terms of forgone apple exports to the latter country. Our estimate is an upper bound because of 
the caveats inherent to price-wedge techniques, and because some SPS measures are likely to 
survive the WTO panel ruling as it was the case in the US-Japan apple dispute (Foster, Calvin 
and Krissoff, 2008). Finally, the welfare analysis shows that it is optimal for Australia to 
eliminate its SPS policy on New Zealand apple imports even in the case of a significant fire 
blight contamination and under various domestic supply conditions, as Australian consumers’ 
gains would largely outweigh producers’ losses. Building on James and Anderson’s findings, we 
cast another doubt on the soundness of some of the Australian SPS policies affecting food trade.   23 
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Table 1. Estimation Results of Maximum Likelihood Estimation  
Parameters  Estimate (Unit)  P-value 
TBT  0.99  0.007 
NZ d   2.21  <0.001 
AU d   1.72  <0.001 
Other d   3.94  <0.001 
g   8.55*10
-5 ($/(km*kg))
  <0.001 
nz h   2.4*10
-6  0.57 
AU h   1.3*10
-6  0.77 
Other h   8.6*10
-6  0.13 
NZ W   0.05 (10
3 MT)  <0.001 
AU W   0.06  (10
3 MT)  <0.001 
Other W   0.89 (10
3 MT)  <0.001 
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Table 2. Dollar Value of TBT Across Years and Changes in Australian imports of New Zealand apples after the TBT removal 
 
Year 




TBT  TBT($/kg) 
Increase in Australian Import 




Increase in Export Revenue  
of NZ apples 
(millions of US$) 













a The values are the mean of the change in import estimates and those values in the parentheses
 are standard errors of the estimates   29 
 
Table 3. Welfare Changes from Elimination of TBT  
Without Disease Transmission  With Disease Transmission (20% reduction) 
Year 
NZ wp  
($/kg) 
Tariff  TBT  CV  
(million $) 














































a The net welfare is CV+  PS D + changes in tariff revenue; the latter revenue is relatively small. 
b The values are the mean of the welfare estimates and those values in the parentheses
 are standard errors of the estimates.    30 
Table 4. Welfare Changes from Elimination of TBT without Disease Transmission 
at Different Elasticity of Australian Apple Supply 
S w =0.2  S w =0.4 
Year  CV 
(million $) 
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Appendix to The Tariff Equivalent and Forgone Trade Effects of Prohibitive  
Technical Barriers to Trade 
(To be posted on Agecon Search)  32 
Appendix Table 1. Countries and Years Included in the Data Set 
 
Australia  1990-2005 
Bangladesh  1991-2004 
Barbados  1998-2005 
Belgium  2000-2004 
Brunei Darussalam  1992-1998, 2001-2003 
Cambodia  2000-2004 
Canada  1991, 1993, 1995-2005 
China  1993-1996, 1998-2005 
Denmark 
1990-1992, 1994-
1995, 1997, 2000, 
2002-2004 
Finland  1990-1995, 1998-2002 
France  1995-2005 
French Polynesia  1996-2005 
Germany  1991-2005 
India  1999-2005 
Indonesia  1990-2005 
Ireland 
1992-1994, 1997-
1998, 2001-2004  
Italy  1994-2005 
Kiribati  1995-1997, 2005 
Malaysia  1990-2005 
Maldives  1998-2005 
Mauritius  1993-2005 
Mexico  1992-2005 
Netherlands  1992-2005 
New Zealand  1990-2005 
Norway  1993-2005 
Philippines  1996-2005 
Portugal  1999-2005 
Russian Federation  1996-2005 
Saudi Arabia  1991-2005 
Seychelles  1995-2005 
Spain  1990-2005 
Sri Lanka  1990-1994, 1999-2005 
Sweden  1992-2005 
Switzerland 
1990, 1992, 1994, 
1997-2005 
Thailand  1990-1991, 1993-2004 
Trinidad and Tobago 1999-2000, 2004-2005 
United States  1991-2005 
United Kingdom  1993-2005   1 
Technical appendix on the methodology  
(For reviewers only to and be posted on Agecon Search) 
1.The log-likelihood function specification is (for observations i=1…N) 
(x,y,wp,d,t;TBT,δ, , ,η)
ln '( )( )(1 )( ) η y
i
NZ
i i i i i i
NZ NZ NZ NZ NZ NZ NZ NZ NZ
g




  + + + +W - -  
W W W W
  ,                (A1.1) 
(x,y,wp,d,t;TBT,δ, , ,η)
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i
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(x,y,wp,d,t;TBT,δ, , ,η)
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X
if x g
f  >  = 
= F  
   ,                                                                                                   (A 2.1) 




AU AU i AU
AU i i
AU AU
g J if x
X
if x g
f  >  = 
= F  
  ,                                                                        (A2.2) 




Other Other i Other
Other i i
Other Other
g J if x
X
if x g
f  >  = 
= F  
,                                                                  (A2.3) 
where 
i
NZ J  is the absolute value of the Jacobian for the transformation from 
i




AU J  is the absolute value of the Jacobian for the transformation from 
i




Other J  is the absolute value of the Jacobian for the transformation from 
i
Other g to 
i
Other x ; f  is the density function of standard normal distribution; andFis the cumulative 
density function of standard normal distribution. 









= ∑  .                                                                                    (A3) 
The program is run in R version 2.4.1. The package mle under the library stats4 is used to 
estimate the maximum likelihood function defined by equations (A1-A3).   2 
2. The algorithm to calculate the increase in imports 
( , ) i j
NZ x , producer surplus
( , ) i j PS  and 
compensating variation
) , ( j i CV after the elimination of SPS measures is as follows in steps 
(1)-(4). 
We define:  
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )




i j i i j
NZ NZ AU NZ NZ
i j i i j
AU AU AU AU AU
i j i i j




a h d e
a h d e




                                            (A4) 
(1) Solve for the new Australian domestic price 
new
AU p  where demand equals supply of 
Australian apples: 
( , ) i j
AUAU X = ( , )
new new
AU AU S p u                                                                       (A5) 
where 
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )
( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
i j new i i j i j i j i i
i j AU AU AU NZ Other AU NZ NZ Other Other
AUAU new i j i j i j
AU NZ AU Other
I AOG p p p
x
p
a a a a
a a a





( , ) ( , )  * population
i j i j
AUAU AUAU X x = ,  ( , )
new new
AU AU S p u  is defined in equation (13); (I AOG - ) 
is Australian per capita expenditure on apples; and 
new u =u if there is no disease 
transmission and 
new u <u  if there is disease transmission. Since there is no explicit 
solution, we used numerical bisection method to solve for
new
AU p . The bisection method is 
illustrated in the calculation of 
( , ) i j CV .  
(2) Calculate the increase in imports of NZ apples in Australia: 
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )
( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
i j i i j i j i j new i i
i j NZ NZ NZ AU Other NZ AU AU Other Other
NZAU i j i j i j
NZ NZ AU Other
I AOG p p p
x
p
a a a a
a a a
- - W + + W + W
=
+ +
      (A6) 
(3) Calculate the producers’ surplus. 
(1 ) 1 ) ( , ) ( /(1 ) /(1 )
s s i j new new
AU s AU s PS p p
w w u w u w
+ + = + - +                                                       (A7) 
 (4) Calculate the 
( , ) i j CV using numerical bisection method. 
 
3. The numerical bisection method is a root finding algorithm. This algorithm repeatedly 
divides an interval in half and then selects the sub-interval in which a root exists. To 
solve for the 
( , ) i j CV  in step (3) on page 19, the function we have is  
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ( ; , )) ( ; , )








p p p y
￿ y
￿
i j i j i j
i j i j i j
f CV , ,I, V ,I,
V ,I CV , ,I,
m m m m m m m m
m m m m m m m m
       (A8)    3 
where V is the indirect utility function obtained from maximizing the utility function 
defined in equation (1) and V is nonlinear in 
( , ) i j CV . There is no explicit solution 
to
( , ) ( )
i j f CV =0, therefore we use the numerical bisection method. The steps are as 
follows: 
(1) Find the interval where the solution of 
( , ) ( )
i j f CV =0 lies in. When there is no 
compensating variation, i.e., 
( , ) i j CV =0, we have f(0)>0; find a 
( , )
max
i j CV , where 
( , )
max ( )
i j f CV <0. 
( , )
max




i j CV ], and we have  f(0)*
( , )
max ( )
i j f CV <0; 
(2)  Divide the interval in two by computing c=0.5*(0+
( , )
max
i j CV )=0.5
( , )
max
i j CV . The two 
intervals are [0,c] and [c, 
( , )
max




i j f CV <0; if f(0)* f(c)<0, then the next sub-interval where the root lies 
in is [0,c], otherwise if f(c)*
( , )
max ( )
i j f CV <0 then the next sub-interval where the root 
lies in is [c, 
( , )
max
i j CV ]. 
 (3) Repeat (4.2) to the sub-intervals with f(x) having opposite signs until the length of 
the interval is less than the tolerance level set. The solution is approximated by the 
mid point of the last sub-interval before the tolerance level is reached.    
 